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Prologue 
 
“There is no greater tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the shield of the law and in 
the name of justice.”1 
Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 
 
Justice is not an abstract philosophical concept. Instead, it is the behaviour and treatment 
based on shared moral and legal principles, as well as common values. Therefore, a legal 
institution aiming to guarantee universal criminal justice and acquire global acceptance and 
support should be institutionally independent from the subjects of the international legal order 
that it regulates. A legal court striving for the elimination of the “tyranny” from the world 
order should not be infiltrated by political actors and the inherent “asymmetry” of 
international politics and public relations. Universality and objectivity with respect to 
membership and degree of states’ cooperation are the right approaches towards a legitimate 
permanent criminal court, such as the International Criminal Court. 
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1
 Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Thomas Nugent 1949), Book XXIX, Section 16. 
2
 Justice in Conflict, Mark Kersten: “The ICC and the Security Council: Just Say No?”, posted on 29 February 
2012, accessible at: http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/02/29/the-icc-and-the-security-council-just-say-no/ 
(accessed on 12 June 2014). 
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I. Introduction 
 
1. Abstract 
The purpose of the present thesis is to analyse and assess the extent to which power 
politics infiltrate the legal process of selection of situations and cases before the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). More specifically, the thesis will debate on the manner in which 
situations are identified for investigations and cases are selected for prosecution. The 
emphasis will be put on a discussion of whether or not contemporary choices to investigate 
certain situations or indict particular individuals derive from mere political assessments or are 
born out of legal considerations. In light of that, the main goal of the present thesis is to 
demonstrate that decision-making in such matters as discussed above is driven by and large 
by political rather than legal calculus. By critically and reflectively analysing various theories 
of justice, I would like to examine whether politics and law should or need to be separated 
when concerning a purely legal and neutral organization of the calibre of the International 
Criminal Court. Additionally, with the present thesis I would like to show that an 
organization, such as the International Criminal Court, pursuing to guarantee “lasting respect 
for and the enforcement of international justice”3 should not let power politics infiltrate the 
legal process of selection of situations and cases respectively. Furthermore, a normative 
ambiguity is created which on its own part undermines the integrity of the judicial process.  
In my view, the idea of an organization able to exercise justice and jurisdiction over 
grave crimes threatening “the peace, security and well-being of the world”4 should not be 
influenced by political trends and the most powerful actors in the political arena. “Well-built-
to-suit” politically motivated cases will undermine not only the image of the Court as a 
permanent institution established “to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most 
serious crimes of international concern,”5 but will also discourage states which are still not 
parties to the statute to sign and subsequently ratify it.  
 
2. Research Methods/Methodology – Scope and Objectives 
 The main argument pursued throughout the thesis is that the institutional autonomy of 
the ICC is imperative if the Court is to be considered as a permanent criminal court bringing 
                                                 
3
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, para. 11. 
4
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, para. 3. 
5
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1. 
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universal justice.
6
 That implies that the Court does not have to be ambiguous and/or biased in 
one way or another with respect to the process of selection of situations and cases. In light of 
that argument, the present thesis will try to prove that the right approach towards the 
establishment of an effective, impartial and not politicized international legal court is via 
legal rather than political calculus. Politics as well as various political affiliations should be 
entirely discarded when considering a purely legal and neutral organization of the calibre of 
the International Criminal Court.  
To the extent of addressing the above line of argumentation, the present thesis adopts 
a qualitative bibliographical research of the relevant literature as well as case-law. The 
methodology to be utilized aims at developing a comprehensive analysis of law and politics 
with respect to their mutual coexistence in a judicial institution. The thesis applies a reflective 
theoretical approach with the assistance of which an evaluation will be made of whether or 
not law and politics should and/or can be separated with respect to a crucial decision-making 
procedural process dealing with an international court. Additionally, the political selection of 
cases before the International Criminal Court will be analysed from the perspective of 
Montesquieu’s trias politica, theories of justice and fairness, as well as the importance of lack 
of bias and inconsistency in legal policies. The normative theory of separation of powers 
established by Montesquieu is central for the kind of argumentation undertaken in the present 
thesis. This theory explains in detail why the politicization and partiality of the ICC need to 
be corrected in light of the legitimate and effective future of the institution. Furthermore, the 
process of political selection will also be reflected from the point of view of the loopholes it 
creates in the law (the idea of global justice) as it stays today.  
In terms of structure, the thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter 
examines in detail not only the practice, jurisdiction and criticism of the International 
Criminal Court, but also the politicization and partiality of the Court with respect to its 
decision-making process of selection of situations and cases. As to the criteria to be used for 
the operationalization and characterization of the selection of situations and cases as political, 
the focus will be put on a discussion of power politics as well as concrete examples in which 
the Court has failed to exercise its neutrality. These examples involve the case of Palestine, 
where the Court withdrew its competence to decide on the validity of the Palestinian 
                                                 
6
 Catherine Gegout, “The International Criminal Court: limits, potential and conditions for the promotion of 
justice and peace”, 34(5) Third World Quarterly 800-818 (2013), p. 801. 
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Declaration,
7
 as well as the numerous cases in Africa as a region where the Court is the most 
active.
8
 Thus, the criteria will be primarily based on the arguments of geographically unequal 
distribution of justice mingled with power politics. The second chapter deals with the 
theoretical (legal and political) approach to be applied when addressing the process of 
selections of situations and cases before the ICC. The emphasis is on the normative theories 
that explicitly explain the need of a divide between the legal and political activities of the 
Court. Moreover, analysis of recognized theoretical approaches to the “idea of justice”, “the 
problem of global justice”, “fairness”, as well as an “appeal to inconsistency (bias)” will be 
extensively elaborated upon. The application of the theory to the actual practice of the 
International Criminal Court is crucial for proving the arguments initially set forth. It is 
essential to be assessed whether or not the practice of the Court complements and/or suffices 
the theory or directly contradicts it. The third chapter examines the practical approach to be 
applied by the Court with respect to the selection of situations and cases for investigation. 
Additionally, it provides a room for improvement and “correction” of the illicit, unfair and 
immoral practice. Furthermore, the last chapter concludes the observations reached in the 
proceedings sections and proves the validity of the line of argumentation pursued throughout 
the thesis.  
 
 
  
                                                 
7
 Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9B651B80-
EC43-4945-BF5A-FAFF5F334B92/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf (accessed 21 May 2014); 
Dapo Akande, ICC Prosecutor decides that he can’t decide on the Statehood of Palestine. Is he right?, available 
at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-prosecutor-decides-that-he-cant-decide-on-the-statehood-of-palestine-is-he-right/ 
(accessed 21 May 2014). 
8
 Office of the Prosecutor, Situations and Cases, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (accessed 21 May 
2014). 
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II. The Politicization and Partiality of the International Criminal Court 
 
1. The creation and legitimacy of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The idea of the establishment of a permanent international criminal court emerged for 
the first time in the aftermath of the First World War
9
 but such a court was never created back 
then.
10
 In the aftermath of the Second World War, two ad hoc international tribunals (The 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East) were established to try individuals who committed war crimes, crimes against 
peace, and crimes against humanity.
11
 Shortly after the United Nations was founded, the 
International Law Commission received the mandate to codify the legal principles that 
emerged during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials,
12
 but progress on this initiative was blocked 
during the Cold War years.
13
 
Towards the end of the 20
th
 century, new impetus for the creation of a permanent 
international criminal court with universal jurisdiction came from a variety of factors, 
including the end of the Cold War,
14
 the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), concerns about their ad hoc nature,
15
 and the strong pressure from public opinion 
outraged by the continued impunity of egregious perpetrators of international crimes.
16
 These 
                                                 
9
 Christopher Keith Hall, “The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court” 322 International 
Review of the Red Cross 57 (1998).  
10
 Robert Cryer (ed.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2010), p. 144. 
11
 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2013), p. 535; Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir 
(Alfred Knopf Inc., New York 1992); Bradley Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (Basic Books, New 
York 1977); R. John Pritchard and Sonya U. Zaide (eds.), The Tokyo War Crimes Trials: The Complete 
Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1981). 
12
 General Assembly Resolution, “Study by the International Law Commission of the Question of an 
International Criminal Tribunal”, UN Doc A/RES/3/260/B (1948).  
13
 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2013), pp. 579 and 583; Robert Cryer (ed.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010), p. 145. 
14
 The Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, convened by General 
Assembly Resolution 49/53 (UNGAOR A/50/22); The Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, convened by General Assembly Resolution 51/207 and 51/160 (UNGAOR 
A/51/22), UN Doc. A/Conf.183/13 (vol. III) 5; Robert Cryer (ed.), An Introduction to International Criminal 
Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010), p. 146. 
15
 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2013), pp. 536, 653-654. 
16
 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2013), p. 652. 
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developments led to the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court (“Rome Statute” or “Statute”).17 The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002.18 
As expressed in its preamble, the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”) 
came into existence to put a halt to impunity,
19
 to contribute to the prevention of the most 
heinous crimes of concern to the international community,
20
 and “to guarantee lasting respect 
for and enforcement of international justice.”21 The Court was established as an independent 
and self-standing international judicial institution.
22
 As such, it is presently the only 
permanent international court having criminal jurisdiction, though still not a universal one, to 
prosecute the perpetrators of the three “most serious crimes of international concern.”23 
 
2. The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
With respect to the principles of jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione loci, ICC 
has “potentially worldwide”24 jurisdiction over “persons”25 accused of having committed 
crimes on the territory (including on board of a vessel or aircraft) of a state party to the Rome 
Statute, or over nationals of a state party regardless of where the act was perpetrated.
26
 
Additionally, the Court can also try nationals of a non-party state either in the case that the 
state has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction on ad hoc basis,27 or pursuant to a decision of the 
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
28
 In that case, ICC has 
                                                 
17
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, as amended on 30 November 1999, 8 May 
2000, 17 January 2001, 16 January 2002, 2187 UNTS 90 (“Rome Statute”). 
18
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 126; Robert Cryer (ed.), An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010), p. 146. 
19
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, para. 5. 
20
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, para. 5. 
21
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, para. 11; The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, art. 1; Judge Philippe Kirsch, “ICC marks five years since entry into force of 
Rome Statute” in Carsten Sluiter (ed.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2009), p. 11; Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal 
Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2013), pp. 653-654. 
22
 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2013), p. 654. 
23
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1; Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to 
International Criminal Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2013), p. 654; Roy S. Lee, 
“The Rome Conference and its Contributions to International Law” in Roy S. Lee (ed.), The International 
Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999), pp. 1-40; Ruth 
Mackenzie, Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), p. 158. 
24
 Robert Cryer (ed.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2010), p. 166. 
25
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 1 and 26. 
26
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12. 
27
To date there have been two declarations in accordance with art. 12(3) of the Rome Statute. One of these 
declarations was made by Cǒte d’Ivoire and another by the Palestinian National Authority. 
28
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12(2); Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to 
International Criminal Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2013), p. 655. 
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jurisdiction to prosecute even if none of the referred states is a party to the Rome Statute or 
gives its consent.
29
  
It is intriguing to observe that prosecutions before the Court seem to be based on a 
combination of both principles of territoriality and nationality, since most of the indicted 
individuals are nationals of a state party and have been accused of having committed crimes 
on the territory of a state party (typically, but not always their own state of nationality).
30
 
“However, when it is a matter of either nationality or territoriality, so far it seems that, as a 
matter of prosecutorial strategy, nationality is a preferred ground.”31 Indeed, this is a valid 
line of argumentation for the present thesis with respect to the case of Palestine. In January 
2009, Palestine lodged a declaration for the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court under 
article 12(3) of the Rome Statute with respect to grave crimes committed on its territory since 
July, 2002. However, the Prosecutor, as a matter of its “prosecutorial strategy,” three years 
after the declaration was lodged with the ICC Registry, in April 2012, “decided that it cannot 
decide” whether Palestine qualifies as a state for the purpose of article 12 of the Statute.32 
What is evident is that the Prosecutor avoids acting upon situations whose jurisdiction rests 
solely on the ground of nationality.
33
 Another instance in light of the same argument is that 
the Security Council explicitly rejected giving the Court jurisdiction over acts of Sudanese 
nationals committed outside Sudan, even if they might have further incited the conflict in 
Darfur.
34
 In both cases, the ICC focuses predominantly on “consensus opponents”35 of the 
UN Security Council, namely, the government of Palestine and the government of Omar al-
                                                 
29
 The situation in Darfur, Sudan, referred to the Court by Security Council Resolution 1593(2005); Robert 
Cryer (ed.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2010), p. 166. 
30
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12; Ruth Mackenzie, Manual on International 
Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), pp. 165-166. 
31
 Ruth Mackenzie, Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), p. 
166. 
32
 Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9B651B80-
EC43-4945-BF5A-FAFF5F334B92/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf (accessed 21 May 2014); 
Dapo Akande, ICC Prosecutor decides that he can’t decide on the Statehood of Palestine. Is he right?, available 
at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-prosecutor-decides-that-he-cant-decide-on-the-statehood-of-palestine-is-he-right/ 
(accessed 21 May 2014). 
33
 For example, allegations by nationals of coalition forces during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Communication 
Received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, 16 July 2003, p. 2; Justice in Conflict, Mark Kersten: “ICC 
Says No to Opening Investigation in Egypt”, posted on 1 May 2014, available at: 
http://justiceinconflict.org/2014/05/01/icc-says-no-to-opening-investigation-in-egypt/ (accessed on 12 June 
2014); Ruth Mackenzie, Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2010), p. 166. 
34
Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/Pages/situation%20icc-
0205.aspx (accessed 21 May 2014). 
35
 The Washington Post, “The ICC may not bring justice to Syria”, available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/12/the-icc-may-not-bring-justice-to-
syria//?print=1 (accessed on 12 June 2014). 
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Bashir in Sudan. For instance, a possible acceptance of the Palestinian declaration may lead 
to subsequent prosecutions of people on the territory of the state of Israel, which is not a state 
party to the Rome Statute, but a strong political ally of the United States. 
Additionally, taking into account the ratione personae jurisdiction of the Court, the 
Rome Statute applies equally to all individuals without any distinction on the grounds of 
official capacity.
36
 Accordingly, the Statute rejects immunity for heads of state, heads of 
government, members of a government or of parliament, elected representatives, or 
governmental officials.
37
 In no case are these high-ranking officials exempted from criminal 
responsibility.
38
 Regarding the jurisdiction of the Court, the first ever ICC indictment against 
a sitting head of state was the one issued by the ICC Prosecutor concerning the Sudanese 
President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir.
39
 This notable indictment is particularly of 
concern to the present paper not only because it addresses essential questions about immunity 
before ICC and the cooperation of state parties regarding waiver of immunities, but mainly 
because it relates to the relationship between state and non-state parties to the statute as well 
as the role of the UN Security Council referrals.
40
  
In light of the principle of jurisdiction ratione temporis (temporal jurisdiction) the 
Court can only investigate crimes committed after July 1, 2002, when the ICC Statute came 
into force.
41
 Whether the Security Council could refer crimes that occurred before 1 July 
2002 to the ICC, on the premise that its authority under the UN Charter trumps any 
provisions under the Rome Statute, is unclear.
42
 
The Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae (subject-matter jurisdiction) over four 
categories of international crime: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the 
                                                 
36
 Ruth Mackenzie, Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), p. 
166. 
37
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 27. 
38
 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. (14 February), 
reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 536, p. 21, para. 58; Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Presents 
Case Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes in Darfur, ICC-OTP-20080714-PR341-ENG (July 14, 2008). 
39
 ICC Prosecutor Presents Case Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, for Genocide, Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur, ICC-OTP-20080714-PR341-ENG (July 14, 2008). 
40
 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2013), p. 93; The Washington Post, “The ICC may not bring justice to Syria”, available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/12/the-icc-may-not-bring-justice-to-
syria//?print=1 (accessed on 12 June 2014). 
41
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 11. 
42
 The Security Council Resolution referring the Darfur situation referred explicitly to the “situation in Darfur 
since 1 July 2002.” UN Doc S/RES/1693 (2005), para. 1. It might be that the Security Council was simply 
confirming that it could not refer a situation prior to that date, but perhaps it might be trying to reserve its 
authority to refer a situation prior to that date. 
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crime of aggression (committed by one state or another).
43
 The ICC Preamble explicitly 
declares that these are “grave crimes” which “threaten the peace, security and well-being of 
the world.”44 Nevertheless, it is essential to notice here that the terms ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ are 
defined neither in the ICC Preamble, nor anywhere else in the Rome Statute.
45
 This on its part 
might potentially lead to different interpretations, which may further undermine the 
legitimacy of the Court.
46
 
 
3. The initiation of investigation – Referring a “Situation” to the Court 
The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the possible commission of one or more of 
the crimes in the Statute after a factual situation is referred to the Prosecutor by: (1) a state 
party; (2) the Security Council of the United Nations (UN); or (3) a non-state party.
47
 States 
and the Security Council may only refer a “situation” to the Court.48 To date, 21 cases in 8 
distinct situations have been brought for investigation before the ICC.
49
 
In terms of self-referrals, three state parties have referred situations on their territories 
to the ICC, namely: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and the Central 
African Republic (CAR).
50
 All these cases have been brought to the attention of the Court 
due to the large scale of the atrocities committed on the territories of DRC, Uganda and CAR 
respectively. 
In order to refer a “situation” to the ICC Prosecutor, the Security Council must be 
acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter.
51
 Consequently, the 
                                                 
43
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 5, 6, 7, 8. 
44
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, paras. 3, 4, 9. 
45
 Catherine Gegout, “The International Criminal Court: limits, potential and conditions for the promotion of 
justice and peace”, 34(5) Third World Quarterly 800-818 (2013), p. 801. 
46
 Catherine Gegout, “The International Criminal Court: limits, potential and conditions for the promotion of 
justice and peace”, 34(5) Third World Quarterly 800-818 (2013), p. 801. 
47
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 12(3), 13(b), 14; Ruth Mackenzie, Manual on 
International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), p. 169; Mahmoud Cherif 
Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2
nd
 revised edn., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 
2013), p. 680; Robert Cryer (ed.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2010), p. 163. 
48
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 13(a)-(b), 14(1); Ruth Mackenzie, Manual on 
International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), p. 169;  
49
 Office of the Prosecutor, Situation and Cases, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (accessed 22 May 
2014). 
50
 William Schabas, “First Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court”, 27 Human Rights Law Journal 25 
(2006), p. 32; William Burke-White, “Complementarity in Practice: the International Criminal Court as part of a 
system of Multi-level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, 18 LJIL 557 (2005), pp. 567-
568; Letter of the Prosecutor of 17 June 2004 attached to the Presidency Decision to assign the situation in 
Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber II. 
51
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html (accessed 11 June 2014), Chapter VII; Dapo Akande, “The 
13 
 
“situation” must be one that involves a “threat to peace and security.”52 Presently, the Council 
has referred to the Prosecutor the situations on the territories of Darfur, Sudan as well as 
Libya, both of which are not state parties to the Rome Statute.
53
 It is widely argued that in 
both referrals the Security Council vehemently politicized and restricted the mandate of the 
International Criminal Court.
54
 The politicization more specifically stems from the fact that 
both referrals exempt citizens of non-state parties from investigation and prosecution.
55
 As a 
result, the legitimacy and independence of the Court are undermined due to the apparently 
frivolous application of Security Council referrals to the ICC.
56
 Consequently, the behaviour 
of states towards the Court has indisputably politicized prosecutions.
57
 Due to the 
involvement of the UN Security Council in the activities of the Court, ICC can be appositely 
described as an “extension of state powers rather than humanity.”58 
Additionally, the Security Council is able to delay the investigation and prosecution of 
a “situation” that has already been referred to the Court for up to a year.59 Subsequently, the 
ICC is obliged to comply with the request of the Council.
60
 Hence, the discretion on part of 
the Council can be characterised as considerable and omnipresent. Furthermore, it is apparent 
                                                                                                                                                        
Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir’s Immunities”, 7 JICJ 333 
(2009); Paola Gaeta, “Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?”, 7 JICJ 315 (2009); Robert 
Cryer (ed.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2010), pp. 163-164. 
52
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html (accessed 11 June 2014), art. 25 and Chapter VII. 
53
 Office of the Prosecutor, Situation and Cases, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, available at: http://www.icc-
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that the Security Council plays an essential role in international criminal justice in cases 
where there is a threat to international peace and security.
61
 
Contrary to the gist of and the general impression from the above discussion 
regarding referrals either by states or by the UN Security Council, according to the Statute of 
the ICC, it is indeed for the Prosecutor, “not for political bodies,” to determine the specific 
cases and suspects warranting investigation.
62
 After it receives referrals of situation from 
state parties to the Rome Statute or from the Security Council, the Prosecutor decides 
“independently” whether or not to open an investigation.63 But does that independent 
decision-making process really take place in practice? How a body influenced by both states 
and the United Nations as such can be unbiased and objective regarding the process of 
selection of situation and cases?  
Thus, the paradox here is that although the ICC Prosecutor is an independent body of 
the Court, its discretion with respect to the process of selection of situations and cases is 
highly politically influenced as it is observed by the ICC jurisprudence. The politicization and 
partiality of prosecutions originate in states’ involvement and behaviour towards 
investigations.
64
 The politicization of the process of selection of situation and cases before the 
ICC, as a dependent variable, can be best demonstrated and assessed relying on two default 
mechanisms. These mechanisms by which prosecutions have been highly politicized are: (i) 
the referrals of situations to the Court either by state parties to the Rome Statute or by the UN 
Security Council; and, (ii) the inconsistency with respect to membership and degree of 
cooperation with the judicial institution.
65
 As a result, current prosecutions have targeted only 
one side of contentious conflicts and reflected only “the strategic political interests of the 
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referring actors.”66 Exactly that pattern of politicisation and evasion of universal justice is 
most clearly observed in the jurisdiction of the Court.
67
 Moreover, it can be argued that the 
ICC is not only politically, but also financially influenced by the same “external factors” - 
states and the United Nations.
68
  
Accordingly, it is evident that the ICC has a close relationship with and “significant 
links” to the Security Council of the United Nations.69 That close cooperation between the 
Court and the UN Security Council provokes another great controversy with respect to the 
impartiality of the Court. Three, namely China, Russia, and the United States, out of the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, are not parties to the Rome Statute of the 
Court and have no prospects of becoming ones any time soon in the near future.
70
 That mere 
fact unveils the reality of a judicial body influenced by the most powerful state actors on the 
international arena. In that regard, the politicization of the ICC stems from the fact that 
international power politics, characterized by “asymmetries of powers”, defines who is 
susceptible to criminal prosecution.
71
 The defective mechanism of the Court that tests the 
politicization here is the lack of universal state cooperation and unanimous involvement in 
the activities of the Court. As Argentina’s ambassador to the United Nations, María Cristina 
Perceval, contends in her address to the UN Security Council regarding a resolution on Syria: 
“[…] there seems once and again to be the purpose that we accept the exercise of political 
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selectivity when it comes to justice […].”72 The Ambassador further stipulates that “[…] 
every heinous crime has to be taken to justice, wherever it is committed and by whomever.”73 
Thus, geographically equal distribution of international criminal justice and universality with 
respect to state participation and cooperation are imperative. 
 
4. The criticism directed at the Court – “ICC on Trial?” 
As a relatively new judicial body, the ICC faces numerous challenges the main of 
which are the creation of institutional autonomy and legitimacy, as well as the building-up of 
a reputation of impartiality, objectivity, and effectiveness.
74
 However, the Court is criticized 
on a regular basis about its lack of coherence with respect to jurisprudence, the limited 
territorial applicability of its jurisdiction, as well as its political affiliations towards powerful 
states.
75
 As explained in the previous section of the present paper, the Court’s “flawed 
perception” mainly stems from the influence of power politics in the process of selection of 
situations and cases for investigation.
76
 ICC is often referred as either the “Western court 
manipulated by the USA and European states,” or the “African Court” as all cases prosecuted 
so far are on the territory of Africa.
77
 Consequently, the territorial selectivity of the Court 
with respect to the exercise of its jurisdiction undoubtedly undermine the principle of 
universal justice and the idea of a permanent criminal court. 
The present thesis puts “ICC on trial” regarding the mentioned above inherent defects 
in its judicial system. More specifically, the constraint on legitimacy on part of the Court is 
dependent upon its lack of universal membership.
78
 As of 1 May 2013, a majority of states in 
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the world (122), but not all states, have ratified the Rome Statute that established the 
permanent institution.
79
 Looking at the map of ratifications, it is apparent that the three major 
political actors on the international arena, namely Russia, China, and the United States, are 
not members of the Court.
80
 Moreover, their acrimonious opposition campaigns against the 
ICC show that ratification of the Rome Statute is highly improbable to ever happen with 
respect to either of them.
81
 Thus, the reality is that although neither of these three influential 
Security Council Member States will ratify the Rome Statute any time soon, either of them 
can lobby for referrals of situations of any other state of the world to the Court based on their 
position in the UN Security Council.
82
 Yet another option for these major powers is to veto 
the adoption of resolution in the Security Council. For instance, quite recently, on 22 May 
2014, for a fourth consecutive time, Russia and China vetoes yet another resolution 
addressing, without even mentioning particular persons or sides of the conflict, war crimes in 
Syria.
83
 Hence, the imbalance of power and the influence of politics can be observed from the 
very initial stage of membership to the permanent court. 
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Instead of striving for universality, the subsequent problem is the Court’s acceptance 
of its imperfect distribution of territorial jurisdiction and concentration exclusively on Africa. 
It is a well-known fact that all cases currently pending before the ICC refer to 8 situations in 
African countries (Uganda, CAR, DRC, Kenya, Sudan, Libya, Cǒte d’Ivoire and Mali).84 
Thereupon, the exclusive focus on Africa substantiates the Court’s partiality and 
politicization, as well as its well-deserved critics as an “African Court.”85 That politicization 
is based on the discussed above two main defect mechanisms part of the institutional 
autonomy of the Court. More specifically, the inconsistency as to membership and degree of 
cooperation with the ICC is assessed as the measurement of the politicization and partiality 
regarding the Court as the “African Court.” 
 Especially the point that the Court is highly selective in its cases will be extensively 
discussed in the present thesis. The impact of the selection of situations and cases on the 
principle of universal justice is of main concern. The politicization and partiality of the Court 
are going to be tested against Montesquieu’s theory of separation of powers. The main 
question here is whether it is accepted for a legal institution to be infiltrated by power politics 
regarding its exercise of jurisdiction. Are not universality, objectivity and indifference the 
right approaches towards a legitimate permanent criminal court? 
 
 In order to further investigate and delve into the issues of the lack of institutional 
autonomy of the Court and the political impartiality with respect to that “purely legal” 
organization, the following Chapter II will provide the reader with some theoretical insights 
in the area of political and legal philosophy. 
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III. The Normative Approach towards the Politicization of the ICC 
 
In order to analyse in depth the decision-making process of selection of situations and 
cases before the International Criminal Court, the following chapter is concentrated on the 
discussion of Montesquieu’s theory of government as well as the process of drafting of the 
American Constitution. The purpose of the present chapter is to explain why Montesquieu’s 
model of separation of powers is the preferred theory to be applied in the analysis of the 
Court’s activities. Additionally, the present chapter provides a discussion of Montesquieu’s 
theory in light of its influence and application to the process of framing the American 
Constitution. More specifically, Montesquieu’s influence upon Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison 
and Adams will be used to exemplify the importance of the ideas of Charles-Louis de 
Secondat for contemporary legal and political discourse.
86
 
 
1. The Spirit of the Laws 
The Spirit of the Laws is widely acknowledged as Montesquieu’s first major work in 
the field of social science.
87
 The book is a compilation of political theories as well as “an 
entirely novel method of approaching jurisprudence” and law in general.88 Montesquieu’s 
main focus throughout the book is on governmental power. The author managed to 
successfully utilize the notion of governmental power and look beyond laws. More 
specifically, Montesquieu evaluates laws and jurisprudence via the spectrum of social factors 
that define and subsequently make them effective. Consequently, Montesquieu’s goal can be 
described as threefold: “(1) to define the structure of law and to classify the entire array of 
social norms to reveal the legal structure of a given society; (2) to demonstrate through 
historical analysis the dynamic relationship between social norms and laws; and (3) to alert 
[…] to the dangers of despotism and foster the liberalization and humanizing of the law in 
every area of social life.”89 
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 According to Montesquieu, “[l]aws are necessary relations arising from the nature of 
things.”90 He further implies that if the laws are properly and systematically analysed, they 
undoubtedly will form the type of government best suited to any nation. But in order to 
correctly assess these legal relations, the “spirit of the law”, in direct contrast to black letter 
law, has to be taken into account. Montesquieu adduces that jurists should look beyond the 
written law to “social, political, economic, cultural and geographical exigencies” that 
determine the spirit of nations.
91
 Only by evaluating all these factors and relationships can 
governmental power be skilfully and prosperously exercised. Consequently, only by 
appreciating the “spirit” of laws can their letter be enforced.92 Respecting “the spirit of the 
laws,” Montesquieu contends on numerous occasions throughout the book that justice should 
be considered neither as granted, nor as some abstract philosophical concept.
93
 For 
Montesquieu, law and justice are inseparable; one necessarily implies the other.
94
 
 
2. The Spirit of the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The theory of separation of powers can be traced back to ancient times. Firstly, 
Aristotle explained the divergence between making law and implementing law, and 
enunciated a natural separation between the legislative and executive branches of 
government.
95
 Subsequently, the separation of powers doctrine was also pronounced in 
England during the civil war (1642-1651).
96
 Additionally, a concept of separation of powers 
is also expressed in the writings of Locke.
97
 
Although it is evident that Montesquieu was not the first proponent of the separation 
of powers doctrine per se, he was undeniably the first to facilitate in-depth analysis and 
explanation of the separation of powers, and to elevate the doctrine from mere theoretical 
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analysis to the actual practice of governments.
98
 For Montesquieu, the three distinct branches 
of a government are: the executive, legislative, and judicial. The gist of Montesquieu’s 
separation of powers is not the mere separation of powers in the strict judicial sense but rather 
“the balance of social powers as a condition for political liberty.”99 Montesquieu strongly 
advocates a distinct and independent judiciary, whose main role is the maintenance of judicial 
order, also in between the other two branches of the government.
100
 Therefore, 
Montesquieu’s three branches of government represent three distinct sources of legal 
authority.
101
 In favouring and endorsing tripartite government, Montesquieu proposed that 
governmental institutions must conform to this crude division between the functions of 
“creating law, enforcing law, and adjudicating disputes arising under the law.”102 
Montesquieu directly derived his renowned theory of separate powers from the 
English Constitution and elaborately discussed it in Book XI of The Spirit of the Laws.
103
 He 
greatly admires the idea of the English constitution, however, he implies that the spirit of 
“extreme liberty” among the English may undercut the legal separation of powers that 
protects personal liberty.
104
 Exactly Montesquieu’s doubtfulness towards England raises 
questions as to what sort of “spirit” a regime must possess in order to sustain a constitution of 
separate powers and in that way to preserve individual liberty.
105
 With respect to that, 
Montesquieu contends that in order to understand any regime one must consider not only the 
legal institutions that are incorporated in it, but also the main motives and ethics that support 
it.
106
 In fact, one must trace the whole range of background conditions that have an impact on 
it.
107
 Only when the social, economic, ethical and geographical factors and interactions are 
properly assessed and taken into account, governmental power can be successfully exercised. 
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More precisely, addressing the “spirit” of the laws of the regime certainly would engage the 
spirit of the regime itself.
108
 
 Furthermore, Montesquieu differentiated between three distinct forms of law, each 
corresponding to a separate governmental function within the “spirit of the regime.” Firstly, 
“the law of nations” rests with the executive and is comprised of the power to guarantee 
public security, conduct foreign policy, and declare war.
109
 Secondly, in the hands of the 
legislature, the main function of the “political law” is to make temporary or permanent 
laws.
110
 Thirdly, the “civil law” rests with the judiciary and incorporates the power to 
adjudicate civil and criminal matters.
111
 Thus, the main rationale with respect to the 
separation of powers doctrine is that the three separate governmental functions remain 
distinct from one another.  
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the 
same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, 
lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to excuse them in a 
tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated 
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and 
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be 
then the legislator. Were it jointed to the executive power, the judge might behave 
with violence and oppression.”112  
In addition to advocating in strong terms the separation of governmental powers doctrine, 
Montesquieu contends that the only way to maintain the separation is through a proper 
system of “checks and balances.”113  
 
3. Montesquieu and the English Constitution 
In Book XI of The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu describes England as the only 
regime “that has political liberty for the direct object of its constitution.”114 “Political liberty” 
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is defined as “being able to do what one should want to do and not at all constrained to do 
what one should not want to do.”115 In analysing the notion of “liberty”, Montesquieu infers 
that distinction should be made between the ideas of “liberty” and “independence.”116 The 
two notions are emphatically different. “Independence” as such means simply “doing what 
one wants,” or the sovereignty of the individual will.117 Montesquieu further implies that 
independence must be “renounced”118 in the name of acquiring political liberty mainly due to 
the fact that liberty connotes living under political and civil laws.
119
 It is important to mention 
here that political liberty according to Montesquieu cannot be simply identified with 
collective self-rule or popular sovereignty.
120
 Additionally, the political liberty of individuals 
must be considered not only in relation to black letter law, namely constitutions, where 
liberty is formed by a certain distribution of the three powers, but primarily in connection 
with the people themselves, their morals and ethics.
121
 Therefore, it is apparent that liberty 
refers to both institutional structure and the individual “tranquillity of mind.”122 According to 
Montesquieu, England is striving for a constitutional distribution of power that aims at 
creating security among individual citizens.
123
 
The English Constitution establishes a functional separation between the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers.
124
 Montesquieu praises the separation of functions in the 
English system, which itself promotes the more effective operation of each of the 
fundamental powers of government.
125
 Mainly due to the fact that the separation of functions 
and powers of government are placed in different hands, no individual can monopolize 
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political power.
126
 Additionally, the differentiation between the three functions in England is 
combined with a system of checks and balances.
127
 
Although Montesquieu maintains that political liberty is established by the laws and 
systems in England, he questions how secure the separation of powers actually is in England 
and explores why it might not be.
128
 Inevitably, Montesquieu raises serious doubts and 
concerns about the English system. For Montesquieu liberty appears as an end in itself and 
not merely as a means to higher ends. That is why throughout The Spirit of the Laws 
Montesquieu on numerous occasions warns the reader against the tendency of people to push 
their liberty and sovereignty to extremes. He contends that extreme liberty inclines to 
undermine liberty itself.
129
 Regarding that line of argumentation it can be implied that 
England is not the ideal regime for Montesquieu.
130
 He considers England as only one 
particular instance of a general constitutional structure based on the principle of separation of 
powers. For Montesquieu, the English regime turns out to be unable to maintain the proper 
legal separation of powers, the “spirit of the laws”, in its constitution. The main reason 
behind the failure of the English system, in Montesquieu’s view, is the spirit of “extreme 
liberty” permeating the entire regime.131 
 
4. Montesquieu’s Influence on the American Constitution 
Montesquieu’s constructive and elaborate discussion of the English Constitution was 
taken as a model for the drafters of the American Constitution in the years between 1776 and 
1787.
132
 Montesquieu’s influence in America was enormous at the time.133 Americans did 
recognize the separation of powers as the primary guardian of liberty.
134
 It is therefore not 
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surprising that Montesquieu’s imprint subsequently permeated the Declaration of 
Independence. 
In America, Montesquieu was not only a frequently cited name in the establishment of 
the three branches of government, but also the person who eloquently harmonized the 
sentiments of the day, the fundamental relationship between “the spirit of nations and the 
nature of government,” into a coherent philosophy.135 The great majority of the leading 
political figures and framers of the American Constitution at that time were well acquainted 
with Montesquieu’s theories. Among others, these figures include, but are not only limited to 
John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, George Mason, John Marshall, James Madison, Alexander 
Hamilton.
136
 For instance, Madison’s interest in Montesquieu extended far beyond the mere 
separation of powers doctrine to the underlying relationship between the spirit of nations and 
the nature of government.
137
 In The Federalist No. 39, James Madison explicitly recognized 
Montesquieu’s dictum as the best to conform to the republican spirit of the American 
nation.
138
 It is crucial to mention here that Madison envisioned the federal system as an 
“ideological confederation” (“a unity of ideas”) based on the principle of separation of 
powers, especially among the executive and judiciary branch.
139
 In Madison’s view, 
federalism has to be based on a common principle shared among the states.
140
 Thus, Madison 
pledged for the acknowledgement of certain principles of republican government as well as 
“socio-cultural uniformity amidst disparate states’ interests.”141 Consequently, while states 
are free to differ over the implementation of various types of governments, the main principle 
of separation of governmental power as promulgated by Montesquieu needs to be 
preserved.
142
 The idea of unitary whole should be greater than the sum of the disparate parts 
composing it.
143
 
Additionally, in The Federalist No. 78 Alexander Hamilton begins the discussion with 
Montesquieu’s premise that liberty depends upon a strict separation of governmental 
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powers.
144
 Hamilton implies that the separation can only be maintained through an 
“independent, life-tenured judiciary vested with the power to strike down unconstitutional 
dictates of the legislatures.”145 The main rationale permeating Hamilton’s proposition is that, 
similarly to Montesquieu, an independent judiciary serves as the guarantor of moderate 
government. More specifically, an independent judiciary is expected to act as a check upon 
popular government.
146
 Furthermore, it is emphasised that an impartial judiciary is able to 
preserve individual rights to the highest possible extent.
147
 With respect to Hamilton’s 
propositions, it can be directly inferred that he had utilized Montesquieu’s theoretical idea, its 
means and ends, to the highest possible extent.
148
 
The provided so far discussion has demonstrated that Montesquieu’s influence upon 
the Framers of the American Constitution extended far beyond the principle of separation of 
powers.
149
 The resiliency of the American Constitution two hundred years after its ratification 
proves that the American political creed, firmly based on a combined systems of separation 
of power and check and balances, accurately reflects Montesquieu’s dicta.150 
 
5. The Spirit of Montesquieu’s Laws and the Laws of the ICC 
Based on the discussion of Montesquieu’s theory of separation of powers, in the 
present section, an assessment will be made hinging on the analysis of whether the 
International Criminal Court falls within Montesquieu’s theory and what similarities and/or 
differences can be established between the Rome Statute of the ICC and the English and 
American Constitutions. In order to qualify the ICC as a regime to which the separation of 
governmental powers theory can be applied, Montesquieu’s model of “typology of regimes” 
will firstly be utilized. 
 According to Montesquieu’s typology of regimes, every government has a “nature” - 
the institutional structure that makes it what it is, and a “principle,” which is directed by its 
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people.
151
 In his typology, Montesquieu further combines the structural features of a type of 
social order (as defined by both its legal and social circumstances/exigencies) with a 
historical appraisal suitable to each structure.
152
 As a result, it is evident that every institution 
is structured in accordance with the types and range of understandings between agents it 
consists of and the ones it encourages.  
Relying exactly on that typology of regimes, more specifically the ideology of a 
regime based on social order established as an institutional structure, an analogy can be 
drawn, for the purpose of the present analysis, between the International Criminal Court, as a 
self-contained regime exercising similar functions to those wielded by governments, and 
governments as described in Montesquieu’s typology. The three main reasons for considering 
the functions of the ICC as similar to those of governments are: (1) the fact that the institution 
is established to act independently from states; (2) the reality that the Court has institutional 
autonomy though the extent of its impartiality is highly disputable; (3) the controversial fact 
that judges are selected by the state parties of the Assembly of States to represent the interests 
of the Court and global justice. Thus, it can be implied that the activities of the Court clearly 
represent a self-contained regime grounded on states’ electorate and independent institutional 
structure similar to those of governments. Therefore, a comparison can be made between the 
Court and Montesquieu’s system of government based on the doctrine of separate powers. 
 
6. The Amalgamation of Law and Politics with respect to the Court 
To the extent of addressing the above line of argumentation, Montesquieu’s theory of 
separation of powers provides the basic features on which the discrepancy and inconsistency 
of the activities of the ICC, especially with respect to its decision-making process of selection 
of situations and cases, can be assessed. It is crucial to notice here that inconsistencies have 
been deeply rooted in the Court since its inception.  
If we consider the structure of the Court as portrayed in the first chapter of the present 
paper, it can be implied that there is neither theme-specific, nor expertise-specific separation 
among the various branches of the institution. Most importantly, there is no clear-cut 
separation between the executive, legislative and judicial powers within the institutional 
structure of the Court. For instance, it can be considered, for the purpose of the present 
analysis, that with respect to the ICC, the executive power rests with member states parties to 
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the Statute, and the judicial and legislative ones both either entirely on the Court itself or on 
the cooperation between the Court and the United Nations. Consequently, there is a strong 
interference between the executive branch, namely states, and the judiciary – the Court itself.  
The most recent example is the veto exercised by Russia and China with respect to 
UN Security Council Resolution referring the war in Syria to the Court for an 
investigation.
153
 The conflict in Syria undoubtedly suffices and even exceeds the gravity 
threshold applied by the Court. In particular, prosecuting the people responsible for the brutal 
violations of international humanitarian law in that particular situation is necessary in order to 
stop the violence in the region, discourage future human rights abuses, and reinforce the 
legitimacy and objectivity on part of the ICC. As Professor Cherif Bassiouni, ex-Chairman of 
the U.N. Investigative Commission for Yugoslavia, stated in 1996, “[i]f peace is not intended 
to be a brief interlude between conflicts, then it must be accompanied by justice.”154 
Consequently, failure to prosecute the leaders responsible for human rights abuses due to 
political affiliations not only undermines the idea of justice, but also encourages future 
violations. Holding the violators of “grave crimes threaten[ing] the peace, security and well-
being of the world”155 is a common responsibility of all states. Selectivity and partiality based 
on political affiliations fail to be characteristics of a universal legal regime. Thus, the lack of 
proper distribution of powers applies limited degrees of objectivity, liberty and fairness 
attributable to each of the three branches with respect to the structure of the ICC. There is no 
clearly established division between the functions of Court regarding law creation, law 
enforcement, and adjudication of disputes arising under the law. This subsequently results in 
the exercise of extreme liberty on part of the ICC as a whole, which according to 
Montesquieu is detrimental.  
Montesquieu speaks of a “delirium of liberty,” not as a fact but as a characteristic of a 
regime.
156
 “Extreme” political liberty is described as intrinsically unstable.157 Therefore, a 
serious doubt about the effectiveness of the ICC system can also be raised regarding the 
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notion of “delirium of liberty.” By connecting “extreme liberty to despotism,” Montesquieu 
rationally raises doubts about the English system.
158
 English liberty will be lost, Montesquieu 
suggests, “when the legislative power becomes more corrupt that the executive.”159 By 
analogy, the limits of the ICC model can be best exemplified by the equal distribution (lack 
of distinct separation) of the three powers in the same way as the English system does. 
Montesquieu’s “best government”, the one that divides and balances power, is substituted by 
a popular “mixture” of powers and “extreme” exercise of sovereignty on parts of states with 
respect to the jurisdiction of the Court.
160
 Therefore, it is obvious that the ICC regime does 
not fit within Montesquieu’s theory of separation of powers. Instead, “extreme liberty”, both 
on part of states on the territory of which jurisdiction can be exercised and on part of judges 
themselves, can be its main characteristic. 
Accordingly, the ICC system is one particular instance of a more general 
constitutional structure defined by the amalgamation and disequilibrium of the powers 
constituting it. As Montesquieu suggested, and as affirmed by the drafters of the American 
Constitution, the constitutional balance of powers is a dimension of political liberty.
161
 
Therefore, absence of separation of powers unequivocally results in political infiltration, in 
the present case, in an entirely legal judicial body. It seems that the ICC as a judicial 
institution is not only vested with judicial powers, but also with legislative and executive. 
Politics, more specifically, member states’ political influences infiltrates the procedural, 
purely legal process of selection of situation and cases before the Court as there is no proper 
separation among the three powers and respectively no proper system of checks and balances. 
Hence, the balance of powers that form the liberty of the ICC can be described as obsolete.  
Furthermore, that balance is distorted from the inception of the legal organization due 
to the lack of universal membership. As mentioned in Chapter 1 of the present thesis, three of 
the most powerful political actors and members of the UN Security Council, are not members 
of the Court. China, Russia and the United States define the territorial application of the 
jurisdiction of the Court regarding UN Security Council referrals, although nationals of these 
countries cannot be held accountable for violations of international criminal law due to 
absence of ratifications of the Rome Statute. Neither of the conflicts in Palestine, 
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Afghanistan, Iraq, currently Ukraine, and Syria scourging dozens of millions of lives have 
been considered “grave” enough to initiate investigations before the ICC. All these conflicts 
failed before the Court due to political affiliations and interference – Israel (interestingly 
enough not a member state to the Rome Statute) in the case of Palestine; the UK and USA 
(not a member to the Rome Statute) in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq; China and Russia 
(not members to the Rome Statute) in the case of Syria and highly probable Ukraine. This 
thesis supports the position that these examples cannot be a characteristic of an independent 
legal court. ICC is permeated by power politics. The absurdity, partiality and politicization 
exercise by the Court with respect to its selection of situations and cases are unprecedented. 
Besides, without resorting to “political moralism,” Montesquieu suggests that a 
constitution based on the notion of “liberty” needs primarily motives beyond “fear and 
interests.”162 More specifically, the separation of powers leans on motives that go beyond 
material interests. Likewise, ICC as well needs to move away from sovereign interests of 
states which apparently undermine its legitimacy. States’ discretion and their unlimited 
independence and sovereignty dispute the impartiality of the court. A universal institution of 
the calibre of the Court has to be independent from states’ influences in order to acquire 
global acceptance and support. Additionally, as the drafters of the American Constitution 
contended in The Federalist No. 78, relying entirely on Montesquieu’s theory of separation of 
powers, “so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and the 
executive liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone.”163 To Alexander 
Hamilton, an independent and life-tenured judiciary therefore forms a “citadel of the public 
justice and the public security.”164 Thus, an independent judiciary serves as the guarantor of 
modern government and is expected to act as a check upon that government. Unfortunately, 
ICC fails to be the “check” and to properly apply Montesquieu’s theory of crude division 
between the functions of creating law, enforcing law, and adjudicating disputes arising under 
the law. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations for Improvement and 
Amendment of the Present Process of Selection of Situations and 
Cases 
 
The present academic paper tried to exemplify to the reader the currently flawed 
structure, lack of institutional autonomy and legitimacy of the International Criminal Court. 
The main argument pursued and proven throughout the thesis is that law and politics should 
be separated from influencing one another with respect to a legal institution of the calibre of 
the ICC. Power politics should not infiltrate directly or indirectly the legal process of 
selection of situation and cases before the Court.  
 In order to demonstrate the current lack of institutional autonomy of the Court as well 
as the destructiveness of that system as to the notion of universal criminal justice, the paper 
utilizes the theory of separation of powers. Montesquieu’s trias politica is tested by analogy 
to the structure and jurisdiction of the ICC. The Court successfully fitted in the theory in light 
of the created analogy between it and a government of a state. However, the Court’s system 
and activities strongly oppose Montesquieu’s dictum regarding the actual separation of 
powers. The absence of institutional autonomy is inherent in the lack of distinct powers –the 
legislative, executive and judicial branch of the Court are mingled. Therefore, based on 
Montesquieu’s theory of an ideal government, the Court’s system is rejected as an example of 
a perfect regime guaranteeing universal justice. Respectively, the extent to which politics 
infiltrate the legal process of selection of situations and cases before the ICC is devastating 
not merely for the institutional autonomy and legitimacy of the Court, but generally for the 
acceptance and evolution of the idea of criminal justice, mainly its rationale to bring both 
retribution and deterrence. 
 Addressing the challenges before the Court, that last section of the thesis argues that 
the overall credibility of the ICC will be increased if some small steps are timely undertaken. 
The major line of argumentation is that the Court should impose universal membership and in 
this way limit the influence of power politics. Additionally, wide recognition and acceptance 
is imperial for a permanent criminal court trying to leave an eternal trace in the area of 
universal justice. 
The main insight for improvement of the defective practices of the ICC is that in order 
to guarantee, preserve and impose universal international criminal justice, the Court should 
be immune from political infiltrations. That point can be ideally achieved if the institutional 
32 
 
autonomy of the Court is assured to the highest possible extent. If the ICC wants to attain 
universal peace and justice as well as acceptance and appreciation, the institutional autonomy 
of the judicial body should be the inevitable first step. The credibility of the ICC is directly 
connected with its “capacity to provide global criminal justice without bias.”165 
In light of that argument, I suggest a number of ways for amendment of the currently 
flawed process of selection of situations and cases. Firstly, the Court should start acting 
independently from states. The easiest way to achieve that is through universal membership. 
ICC is established as a “permanent court” with “power to exercise its jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern […].”166 Thus, if all states 
comprising the international community of states are members to the Court not only 
universality with respect to the exercise of territorial jurisdiction will be exercised, but also 
there won’t be any differences on the ground of political power and influence. Additionally, 
the reference of the Court as an “African Court” and its critics about Western influence will 
be eradicated. On the other side, leaders of powerful states such as the United States of 
America, Russia, China, Israel, India, among others, will also face justice. In that way, the 
Court will further concrete its legitimacy, institutional autonomy and prestige.  
In the alternative, the second proposition is not as radical as the first option. If 
unanimity cannot be achieved with respect to membership, as too many political interests 
such as sovereignty and immunities are involved, then there should be a modification in the 
process of referrals of situations and cases to the Court. Instead of Security Council referrals, 
the present paper suggests referrals on part of the UN General Assembly. In that way, the 
three influential members of the Security Council, namely Russia, China and the United 
States of America, will not have the final say in shaping the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Moreover, by implementing the recommendation and reforming the process of decision-
making, each and every one of the “problematic” and influential states can be held 
accountable for violations of international criminal and humanitarian law. If the vote and 
subsequently the decision lie with the UN General Assembly, all states members to the 
international community will have a stand and their opinion and vote will be adequately 
addressed.  
 Certainly the ICC has great potential to become the only permanent international 
criminal court guaranteeing universal peace and criminal justice. It is incontestably a court 
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“with an ethical aim,”167 whose full institutional autonomy, legitimacy and potentials are just 
about to be realized if some institutional amendments are made to the Rome Statute. 
 To sum up, bias, subjectivity and institutional failure cannot anymore characterize the 
permanent criminal court. The International Criminal Court has the capability to become a 
universal regulator in the area of international criminal and humanitarian law only if it 
successfully limits the extent to which politics infiltrate the legal process of selection of 
situations and cases before the Court. 
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